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PLACING “REINS” ON REGULATIONS:
ASSESSING THE PROPOSED REINS ACT
Jonathan H. Adler*
Over the past several decades, the scope, reach and cost of federal
regulations have increased dramatically, prompting bipartisan calls for
regulatory reform. One such proposed reform is the Regulations From the
Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (REINS Act). This proposal aims to re-
store political accountability to federal regulatory policy decisions by re-
quiring both houses of Congress to approve any proposed “major rule.” In
effect, the REINS Act would limit the delegation of regulatory authority to
federal agencies, and restore legislative control and accountability to Con-
gress. This article seeks to assess the REINS Act and its likely effects on
regulatory policy. It explains why constitutional objections to the proposal
are unfounded and many policy objections overstate the REINS Act’s likely
impact on the growth of federal regulation. The REINS Act is not likely to
be the deregulatory blunderbuss feared by its opponents and longed for by
some of its proponents. The REINS Act should be seen more as a measure to
enhance accountability than to combat regulatory activity.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the scope, reach, and cost of fed-
eral regulations have increased dramatically as federal agencies have
developed rules and policies to address an expanding array of public
policy concerns.1 From air pollution and health insurance to wireless
communications and consumer finance, a proliferating number of fed-
eral agencies are responsible for developing regulations to address an
ever-growing number of policy problems.2 This increase in regulatory
activity has been facilitated by the wholesale delegation of quasi-legis-
lative regulatory authority to federal administrative agencies. While
expedient, and perhaps necessary,3 the widespread practice of delega-
tion has diminished political accountability for regulatory decisions.
As the federal regulatory state has grown, congressional account-
ability for regulatory policy choices has declined. One reason for this
decline in accountability is a deterioration of legislative control. There
are too many agencies doing too many things for any member of Con-
gress to stay abreast of all but the most important or controversial
regulatory initiatives.4 Even if congressional committees keep tabs on
agency activities, the average member of Congress does not, to say
nothing of his or her constituents.5 As now-Justice Elena Kagan ob-
1. It is fair to say that federal regulations touch nearly every aspect of a person’s
life. See, e.g., KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY: POLICYMAKING IN
THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 2 (3d ed. 1992) (detailing how federal regula-
tions affect individual citizens’ daily routines, from what they eat, to what they drive,
to what they hear on the radio, and more).
2. Among the new administrative agencies created since 2010 are the Independent
Payment Advisory Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. According
to the Congressional Research Service, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
alone “creates, requires others to create, or authorizes dozens of new entities to imple-
ment the legislation.” CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41315, NEW
ENTITIES CREATED PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT 1 (2010).
3. The basic case for delegation of regulatory authority was provided by James
Landis. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). For
the case against delegation, see generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RE-
SPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
4. The Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, pub-
lished twice a year by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, routinely lists
over 4,000 regulatory initiatives in various stages of development at any given time.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY PLAN AND THE
UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY ACTIONS, available
at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
5. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (noting that congres-
sional oversight does not necessarily represent or advance the position of congres-
sional majorities due to the delegation of such authority to oversight committees and
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served after serving in the White House counsel’s office, Congress’s
“capacity to control agency discretion is restricted.”6
Administrative agencies are empowered—and in some cases re-
quired—to implement policies that would not be approved by Con-
gress, at least not in the same form.7 Long after authorizing legislation
is adopted, agencies continue to adopt regulations and implement poli-
cies without meaningful congressional input. Increasing efforts to in-
sulate executive branch actions from legislative control have
magnified this trend.8 At the same time, presidential administrations
of both parties have used administrative regulations to implement poli-
cies and programs that fail to obtain legislative support.9
The simultaneous increase in regulatory activity and decline in
political accountability has produced renewed calls for regulatory re-
form from figures within both major political parties. In recent years,
the House of Representatives has debated and passed several regula-
tory reform measures endorsed by the Republican leadership, includ-
ing bills that would mandate greater use of cost-benefit analysis and
revise large portions of the Administrative Procedure Act.10 Demo-
the disproportionate influence of individual members of Congress who may not be
representative of their caucus).
6. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2347
(2001) (“[B]ecause Congress’s most potent tools of oversight require collective action
(and presidential agreement), its capacity to control agency discretion is restricted.”).
7. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2011), for example, agencies will be required to adopt regulations for
many years to come, even though it is quite clear the statutory provisions mandating
such regulatory measures could not pass Congress again in the foreseeable future.
Concern for this phenomenon is one motivation for the adoption of sunset provisions.
See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRES-
SIONAL OVERSIGHT 27–28 (1990).
8. See generally Kagan, supra note 6. R
9. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior:
A Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 212–16 (2001) (explaining how the Clinton
Administration pursued administrative reforms due to congressional deadlock on the
Administration’s reform proposals); Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 4, 2004, at 38, 40 (describing the Bush Administration’s reali-
zation that the Clear Skies Initiative lacked congressional approval, and their subse-
quent decision to bring about environmental change administratively through the new-
source review regulations); Clear Skies, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/clearskies/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2012); see also Wendy Koch, Obama
Could Cut Emissions Without Congress, Group Says, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2012,
5:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/04/obama-carbon-
power-plant-emissions-congress/1745881/ (discussing potential initiatives the Obama
Administration could take to address greenhouse gas emissions without the passage of
additional legislation).
10. E.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 3010, 112th Cong. This bill
passed the House on Dec. 2, 2011 with unanimous Republican support (albeit with
seven abstentions), and nineteen Democrats voting aye (and six abstaining).
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cratic Senator Mark Warner has proposed limiting the ability of agen-
cies to adopt new rules without eliminating old ones,11 and President
Obama issued an executive order requiring agencies to evaluate the
success of past regulations and revise or eliminate those that are too
costly or ineffective.12 This reform effort was designed, among other
things, to seek public input to improve regulatory measures and
“change the regulatory culture of Washington.”13
One regulatory reform proposal that has received substantial at-
tention is the Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act
(REINS Act).14 The Act would attempt to reassert legislative control
over regulatory policy decisions by requiring both Houses of Congress
to approve any proposed “major rule.”15 In effect, the REINS Act
would limit the delegation of regulatory authority to federal agencies
and restore legislative control and accountability to Congress. This
legislation has attracted significant political support, albeit primarily
from one side of the aisle. In December 2011 the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives passed a version of the REINS Act,16 and a similar propo-
sal was endorsed by Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney.17
11. Mark R. Warner, Op-Ed., Red-tape Relief for a Sluggish Recovery, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2010, at A19.
12. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); see also Kori
Schulman, A 21st Century Regulatory System, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 26,
2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/26/21st-century-regula-
tory-system (describing Obama’s call for comprehensive review of existing regula-
tions); 2012 Democratic National Platform: Moving America Forward,
DEMOCRATS.ORG, http://www.democrats.org/democratic-national-platform (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2012) (same).
13. Cass Sunstein, 21st-Century Regulation: An Update on the President’s Re-
forms, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2011, at A17.
14. Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10,
112th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 7, 2011). Similar legislation was introduced in
1995 as the Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 2727, 104th Cong.
15. A major rule is defined as any rule that the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs concludes is likely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more or otherwise have significant effect on consumer prices or the econ-
omy. See H.R. 10, 112th Cong. § 3 (to amend 5 U.S.C. § 804(2)).
16. See Felicia Sonmez, REINS Bill to Expand Congressional Power over Execu-
tive Regulations Passed by House, WASH. POST: 2CHAMBERS BLOG (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/reins-bill-to-expand-congres-
sional-power-over-executive-regulations-passed-by-house/2011/12/07/gIQAs6VM
dO_blog.html.
17. See Mitt Romney, Believe in America: Mitt Romney’s Plan for Jobs and Eco-
nomic Growth, ROMNEY FOR PRESIDENT, INC. (July 1, 2012), http://www.mittromney.
com/sites/default/files/shared/BelieveInAmerica-PlanForJobsAndEconomicGrowth-
Full.pdf (“Mitt Romney supports implementation of a law, similar to the REINS Act
now before Congress, that would require all ‘major’ rules (i.e., those with an eco-
nomic impact greater than $100 million) to be approved by both houses of Congress
before taking effect. If Congress declines to enact such a law, a President Romney
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REINS Act supporters hail the legislation as a needed check on
federal regulatory agencies. Opponents rail against it as a potentially
unconstitutional attack on federal regulations that could undermine
health, safety, and environmental protections.18 Some business- and
market-oriented groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce19 and
the Competitive Enterprise Institute,20 believe the Act will constrain
the growth of intrusive federal regulation. The Natural Resources De-
fense Council, on the other hand, calls the REINS Act a “radical” and
“perilous” proposal that would hamstring needed regulatory initia-
tives.21 According to the NRDC’s David Goldston, “it is hard to imag-
ine a more far-reaching, fundamental and damaging shift in the way
the government goes about its business of safeguarding the public.”22
The REINS Act’s most ardent proponents and most strident crit-
ics both assume that the Act would stem the flow of federal regulation
from the nation’s capital, but is this so? A more measured look at the
REINS Act suggests that it could enhance regulatory accountability
and popular input on major regulatory proposals, but may not do all
that much to slow the proliferation of federal rules, particularly those
that command popular support. Whether or not the REINS Act would
prove much of an obstacle to additional regulatory initiatives or re-
forms, in all likelihood it would help stem the continuing accretion of
executive authority over domestic affairs.
This article seeks to assess the REINS Act and its likely effects
on regulatory policy were it to be enacted. Part I provides a brief over-
will issue an executive order instructing all agencies that they must invite Congress to
vote up-or-down on their major regulations and forbidding them from putting those
regulations into effect without congressional approval.”).
18. See, e.g., Noah M. Sachs, When It REINS, It Pours, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb.
10, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/83195/reins-act-congress-
veto-gop.
19. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Applauds House
Passage of REINS Act (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/
releases/2011/december/us-chamber-applauds-house-passage-reins-act.
20. See Nicole Ciandella, House Expected to Vote Tomorrow on REINS Act, COM-
PETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Dec. 6, 2011), http://cei.org/news-releases/house-expected-
vote-tomorrow-reins-act; Wayne Crews, It’s Time to Regulate the State, FORBES
(Nov. 2, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/11/02/regulation-congress-
reins-act-opinions-columnists-wayne-crews.html.
21. David Goldston, The REINS Act: Why Congress Should Hold Its Horses,
SWITCHBOARD: NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (July 1, 2012), http://
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dgoldston/the_reins_act_why_congress_sho.html.
22. Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011: Hearing on
H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 124 (2011) [hereinafter REINS Act Hearing II] (testi-
mony of David Goldston, Director of Government Affairs, Natural Resources Defense
Council).
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view of how the delegation of regulatory authority has facilitated the
growth of federal regulation and the decline in congressional account-
ability for regulatory decisions. Part II places the REINS Act in the
context of prior efforts to control regulatory delegation, most notably
the Congressional Review Act, upon which the REINS Act would
build. Part III provides an overview of the REINS Act and describes,
in some detail, how the law would (and would not) operate. Part IV
addresses concerns that have been raised about the REINS Act’s con-
stitutionality. Part V addresses policy concerns, and explains why the
REINS Act is not likely to be the deregulatory blunderbuss feared by
its opponents and longed for by some of its proponents. The article
then concludes with some closing thoughts about why the REINS Act
should be seen more as a measure to enhance accountability than to
combat regulatory activity.
I.
REGULATION AND DELEGATION
Federal regulatory activity has increased dramatically over the
past half-century. One need only look at the six-fold increase in the
annual number of pages in the Federal Register from the 1950s to the
2000s for evidence of this increase.23 The number of new final rules
each year has declined from its 1970s peaks, but federal regulations
are still adopted at a rapid pace.24 Federal agencies finalized over
3,500 regulations per year in 2009, 2010, and 2011.25 Recent rules
cover everything from greenhouse gas emissions,26 to conflict mineral
disclosures,27 to electronic fund transfers,28 and the energy and water
23. See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND
COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE
(2012), available at http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20-%2010,
000%20Commandments%202012_0.pdf. In the 1950s, federal agencies published an
average of fewer than eleven thousand pages per year. Id. at 17. During the 2000s,
federal agencies have averaged over seventy thousand per year. Id. at 16. In 2011, the
Federal Register contained over eighty-one thousand pages, over one-quarter of
which were devoted to final agency regulations. Id. at 2. While Federal Register
pages are an imperfect proxy for the number of regulations issued or regulatory bur-
dens imposed, the dramatic increase from the 1950s to 2000s illustrates the increase in
federal regulatory activity over this period.
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13,
2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
27. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249(b)).
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use of home appliances.29 Substantially more regulation is on the way.
The Fall 2011 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregu-
latory Actions lists over 4,000 additional regulations in various stages
of the regulatory pipeline.30 By some estimates, the Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) alone will require
over three hundred federal rulemakings.31 The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act will require dozens more.32
The growth of federal regulatory activity has been “a bipartisan
enterprise” and Republican presidents have presided over some of the
greatest regulatory surges.33 Federal regulations have been adopted to
address a wide array of public policy problems and have also imposed
significant costs on American business and consumers. According to
one frequently cited (but disputed) estimate, the aggregate costs of
federal regulations could exceed $1.5 trillion per year34—substantially
28. Health Care Electronic Funds Transfers (EFT) and Remittance Advice, 45
C.F.R. § 162.1601–1603 (2012).
29. Rule Concerning Disclosures Regarding Energy Consumption and Water Use
of Certain Home Appliances and Other Products Required Under the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act (“Appliance Labeling Rule”), 16 C.F.R. pt. 305 (2012).
30. Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregu-
latory Actions, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaMain (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). Note that the federal government
did not release any Unified Agenda for 2012 until a single report for the year was
released in December. See Tim Devaney, OMB Report: ‘No Regulatory Tsunami on
Way’, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2012, at A4.
31. See Too Big Not to Fail, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at 23 (reporting Dodd-
Frank contains four hundred rule-making requirements, of which only ninety-three
had been completed); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41472, RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), available at http://www.
llsdc.org/attachments/files/255/CRS-R41472.pdf. The Copeland report identified three
hundred thirty provisions in Dodd-Frank requiring or authorizing rulemakings by fed-
eral agencies and concluded that the ultimate number of rulemakings that will result
from the statute is “unknowable.” Id. at 4.
32. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS PURSU-
ANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010) (“it seems
likely that there will be a great deal of regulatory activity relating to the many provi-
sions in PPACA for years, or even decades to come.”), available at http://www.ncsl.
org/documents/health/Regulations.pdf.
33. Christopher DeMuth, The Regulatory State, NAT’L AFF., Summer 2012, at 70,
70; see also Over-regulated America, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at 9, 9 (“Gov-
ernments of both parties keep adding stacks of rules, few of which are ever re-
scinded.”). The first President Bush, for example, earned the moniker “the regulatory
president” due to the dramatic increase in federal regulations during his single term.
Jonathan Rauch, The Regulatory President, 23 NAT’L J. 2902 (1991).
34. See NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF
ADVOCACY, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS (2010), available
at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/rs371tot.pdf (estimating regulatory costs of
$1.75 trillion). This study has been challenged for over-estimating the costs of federal
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more than the total amount collected from individual income taxes
annually.35 Just like taxes, regulations may be necessary to address
public ills or to provide important public benefits, and many regula-
tions may provide benefits greater than their costs, but this does not
make the costs irrelevant.36 At the same time, regulations often pro-
duce unintended consequences, the costs (or benefits) of which are not
accounted for at the time the rules are adopted.37 The fact that regula-
tions can both impose substantial costs and generate substantial bene-
fits makes it that much more important that there be political
accountability for federal regulatory decisions.
A. Delegation
The practice of delegating substantial amounts of regulatory au-
thority and policy discretion to federal regulatory agencies has facili-
tated the dramatic increase in the scope of federal regulation.38 Under
regulation and failing to account for regulatory benefits. See Lisa Heinzerling &
Frank Ackerman, The $1.75 Trillion Lie, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 127 (2012);
John Irons & Andrew Green, Flaws Call for Rejecting Crain and Crain Model, ISSUE
BRIEF (Econ. Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), July 19, 2011, at 1–9, available at
http://www.epi.org/publication/flaws_call_for_rejecting_crain_and_crain_model/; see
also SIDNEY SHAPIRO, RUTH RUTTENBERG & JAMES GOODWIN, CTR. FOR PROGRES-
SIVE REFORM, Setting the Record Straight: The Crain and Crain Report on Regulatory
Costs (2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/SBA_Regula-
tory_Costs_Analysis_1103.pdf.
35. CREWS, supra note 23, at 10–11. R
36. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_
report.pdf; see also RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RA-
TIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
AND OUR HEALTH (2008) (arguing cost-benefit analysis may justify more stringent
regulation).
37. For example, regulations requiring the widespread use of oxygenates in gaso-
line encouraged the use of a particular additive, methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE),
which caused widespread groundwater contamination throughout the country. See Ar-
nold W. Reitze, Jr., Biofuels—Snake Oil for the Twenty-First Century, 87 OR. L. REV.
1183, 1190–95 (2008); Douglas A. Henderson & Mary K. McLemore, MTBE: A Tale
of Air, Water, and Civil Procedure, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Spring 2005, at 20, 20–21.
On the other side of the ledger, regulations limiting automobile carbon monoxide
emissions appear to have reduced the number of suicides due to asphyxiation. See M.
Shelef, Unanticipated Benefits of Automotive Emission Control: Reduction in Fatali-
ties by Motor Vehicle Exhaust Gas, 146/147 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 93, 93–94 (1994).
38. For histories of the growth of the regulatory state tailing the increase in delega-
tion, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, see MARC ALLEN EISNER, JEFF WORSHAM &
EVAN J. RINGQUIST, CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY POLICY 35–44 (1999); CORNELIUS
M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING 8–20 (3d ed. 2003); WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING 16–31 (1985).
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existing doctrine, Congress has virtually unlimited discretion to dele-
gate policymaking authority to federal agencies, and uses this author-
ity regularly.39 Through such delegation, Congress evades
accountability by shifting responsibility for the resulting policies to
administrative agencies, undermining political control of regulatory
policy.
Agency power to regulate private activity can only come from
Congress. Federal regulatory agencies have no inherent powers of
their own. Article I, section 1 of the Constitution vests all legislative
power in the Congress.40 Federal agencies only have the power to
adopt rules governing private conduct if such power has been dele-
gated to them through a valid statutory enactment.41 As the Supreme
Court has explained, “It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s
power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress.”42
Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated
ever-greater regulatory authority to more and more federal agencies.
Congress has often had good reasons for this escalation of delega-
tion.43 The economic, environmental and other problems Congress
sought to address were complicated and often necessitated careful
study and analysis. Delegation of regulatory authority to agencies with
greater technical expertise and staff resources is a way to ensure that
federal regulations are adopted to address the nuances and particulars
39. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (unpublished manuscript at 1) (on file with the N.Y.U.
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy) (“At least since the New Deal, this delega-
tion of discretionary regulatory power, exercised in an open-ended fashion, has been
the archetypal form of delegation. It is not the mere power to ‘fill up the details’ that
Congress left unspecified in a policy that is otherwise clearly established. It is the
power to make the policy that Congress self-consciously chose not to make.”).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States . . . .”).
41. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The FCC,
like other federal agencies, ‘literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress
confers power upon it.’” (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374
(1986))).
42. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); see also La.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).
43. See, e.g., DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 133–34 (2000) (“Congress can delegate its legislative authority to
the agencies at its discretion for a wide variety of reasons: to alleviate its workload; to
avoid a particularly nettlesome political issue; to focus highly specialized administra-
tive expertise on a particular problem; for convenience; or simply because the agen-
cies do not face the constraints of a legislature that is reconstituted every two years.”).
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of specific problems.44 At the same time, developing and issuing leg-
islative-like rules is easier within a hierarchical regulatory agency than
within a legislative body with hundreds of voting members.45
Under the “nondelegation doctrine,” Congress is precluded from
delegating legislative power to administrative agencies.46 In principle,
this doctrine ensures that Congress remains responsible for the major
policy judgments that drive regulatory decisions.47 In practice, how-
ever, delegation enables Congress to pass the buck to the executive
branch.48 Under existing precedent, the nondelegation doctrine does
not impose significant constraints on the delegation of rulemaking
power. Congress need only provide federal agencies with an “intelligi-
ble principle” to guide regulatory initiatives.49 It does not take much
to satisfy this standard; virtually any broad statement of policy will
do.50 The Supreme Court has found an “intelligible principle” in stat-
utes authorizing federal agencies to set “generally fair and equitable”
prices51 and to regulate in the “public interest.”52 As Justice Antonin
Scalia summarized, the Court has “almost never felt qualified to sec-
ond-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judg-
ment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”53
Delegation may be expedient, or even necessary, but it also has
costs. When Congress delegates broad regulatory authority to execu-
tive or independent agencies, it inevitably loses some degree of con-
44. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (noting that “in our
increasingly complex society, . . . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability
to delegate power under broad general directives”).
45. See DeMuth, supra note 33, at 72 (“A hierarchy can make decisions with much R
greater dispatch than a committee can.”).
46. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
47. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“[T]he delegation doc-
trine [was] developed to prevent Congress from forsaking its duties.”); see also Indus.
Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the doctrine ensures “that important choices of social policy are
made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular
will”).
48. Kagan, supra note 6, at 2347 (“Congress rarely is held accountable for agency R
decisions . . . .”).
49. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472; see also J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (delegation is permissible provided that “Congress . . . lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to guide the agency).
50. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004) (noting that Congress
only may not grant “something approaching blank-check legislative rulemaking
authority”).
51. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 426 (1944).
52. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943).
53. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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trol over how that authority is exercised. The resulting loss of political
accountability for regulatory decisions has allowed regulatory agen-
cies to adopt policies at odds with congressional intent or contempo-
rary priorities. This is particularly so when Congress delegates broad
authority to pursue generic—almost platitudinous goals—such as ad-
vancing the public welfare or protecting public health.54 For instance,
if Congress instructs a federal agency to adopt measures that will ad-
dress a given environmental problem as far as is practicable, the fed-
eral agency retains substantial discretion to determine what sorts of
measures should be adopted and at what cost. And should the agency
veer off course and adopt a measure of which Congress disapproves, it
is not so easy to put the genie back in the bottle.55
Federal agencies are left with tremendous amounts of discretion
in how they exercise their regulatory power. For example, the newly
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is instructed to “ensure
that ‘all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial
products and services . . . [that] are fair, transparent, and competi-
tive.’”56 A statute’s “intelligible principle” need not even dictate a
policy direction. Under existing doctrine agencies are free to reverse
course and overturn prior policies without any meaningful input from
Congress.57 As a consequence, legislators may take credit for enacting
high-minded legislation while simultaneously decrying the faults of
agency implementation.58 Ambiguous delegations both enhance
54. See, e.g., id. at 465–67.
55. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Struc-
ture and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 437 (1989) (“[E]ven with perfect monitor-
ing of agency noncompliance, no legislative remedy is available to the original coali-
tion that will restore its original agreement.”).
56. Establishment of the Consumer Advisory Board and Solicitation of Nomina-
tions for Membership, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,725, 10,726 (proposed Feb. 23, 2012) (citing
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1021(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)).
57. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) (“The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has similarly indicated that a court’s
standard of review is ‘heightened somewhat’ when an agency reverses course. . . . We
find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement
that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no
such heightened standard.”).
58. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRAC-
TION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 37 (1997); see also David Schoenbrod, How REINS
Would Improve Environmental Protection, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 347, 349
(2011).
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agency authority and enable Congress to escape political accountabil-
ity for difficult policy choices.59
Judicial review helps ensure that agencies play by the rules set
out by Congress—that agencies provide adequate notice and opportu-
nity for public participation,60 provide sufficient explanations for the
rules they adopt,61 and observe the limits of their regulatory jurisdic-
tion.62 Yet judicial review is not a substitute for political oversight of
regulatory agencies, as courts do not (or at least should not) delve into
the policy choices agencies make.63 Progressive Era reformers may
have believed that regulatory administration could be an expertise-
driven, value-neutral enterprise.64 Today we are more skeptical.65
Rulemaking may indeed involve some scientific or technical expertise,
but it also involves normative policy judgments. Whether a given
agency is following the best policy course and properly resolving in-
evitable trade-offs between competing goals is ultimately a normative
policy decision that should be reserved for the political branches.66 If
59. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2155 (2002) (noting that “ambiguity allows Congress
to evade accountability”); see also Mathew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of
Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2006) (discussing various explanations for the
enactment of ambiguous authorizing statutes).
60. E.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding inade-
quate notice and opportunity for comment on EPA’s “mixture” and “derived-from”
rules).
61. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 46 (1983) (finding NHTSA’s rescission of airbag standard arbitrary and
capricious).
62. E.g., Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 458–59 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that FTC exceeded its statutory authority by regulating attorneys as “financial
institutions”).
63. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (not-
ing that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of an agency” (quoting Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
64. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
98–109 (1973).
65. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995) (explaining how “agencies exaggerate the contri-
butions made by science in setting toxic standards in order to avoid accountability for
the underlying policy decisions”); see also ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BRO-
KER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND POLITICS (2007) (discussing how
normative policy questions are often presented as value-neutral scientific questions).
66. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(“[I]t is appropriate that our standard of review of the substance of agency decisions
be as limited as the APA provides. We do not reverse simply because there are uncer-
tainties, analytic imperfections, or even mistakes in the pieces of the picture petitions
have chosen to bring to our attention, . . . but only when there is such an absence of
overall rational support as to warrant the description ‘arbitrary or capricious.’”).
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delegation is to be restrained and accountability restored, this must be
accomplished by Congress, not the courts.
B. Old Statutes, New Regulations
The difficulty of ensuring that agencies remain politically ac-
countable for their policy choices is magnified by time. Agencies to-
day continue to exercise authority granted decades ago under statutes
drafted to address different policy concerns.67 The Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC), for example, is still implementing author-
ity to regulate in pursuit of “the public interest” under the
Communications Act of 1934.68 Yet the communications technologies
and associated industries regulated by the FCC today are a far cry
from those that existed before World War II. The 1934 Act was not
Congress’s last word on communications regulation, but even the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 is “woefully outdated.”69
In an effort to keep pace with technological change, the FCC has
strained to find regulatory authority in the relevant statutes for new
regulatory initiatives. The 1996 Act embodies a “stovepipe” regula-
tory framework that, among other things, relies upon regulating tele-
communications apart from information services.70 Yet this distinction
is increasingly artificial and obsolete.71 The FCC is faced with the
choice of plowing ahead with new regulatory initiatives that lack firm
statutory grounding, or risking obsolescence. In recent years the FCC
has adopted the former strategy, promulgating rules that seek to estab-
lish Internet “neutrality” without clear textual warrant.72 Whether or
not such an approach makes sense from a policy standpoint, it has
never been authorized, let alone endorsed, by Congress.
The FCC is not alone in this sort of endeavor. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is in the midst of implementing a series of
regulations governing the emission of greenhouse gases from mobile
67. See Schoenbrod, supra note 58, at 347 (noting “the statutes that empower the R
agencies are increasingly obsolete”).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 303(y)(2)(A) (2006).
69. See Randolph J. May, Why Stovepipe Regulation No Longer Works: An Essay
on the Need for a New Market-Oriented Communications Policy, 58 FED. COMM. L.J.
103, 103 (2006).
70. Id. at 104.
71. See id. As May notes, “However serviceable these definitional constructs may
have been at an earlier time, . . . they are no longer serviceable in a world in which
digital technology is rapidly displacing analog.” Id. at 106–07.
72. See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,192 (Sept. 23, 2011);
see also Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (vacating and
remanding prior FCC order for exceeding agency’s statutory authority).
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and stationary sources.73 These regulations are intended to address the
threat of global climate change and will have a tremendous effect on
the American economy and affect thousands, if not millions, of facili-
ties around the country. The EPA’s authority for these regulations is a
statute passed by Congress, the Clean Air Act,74 which the Supreme
Court interpreted to authorize regulation of greenhouse gases.75 Yet
there is no indication that Congress has ever supported the EPA taking
such actions, let alone that any Congress would enact legislation to
mandate this result.76
The Clean Air Act’s basic architecture was enacted in 1970.77
Key provisions were added in 197778 and 1990,79 and the Act has not
been amended to any significant degree in over twenty years.80 Ac-
cording to the EPA, these decades-old provisions authorize (if not
compel) it to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks,
utilities, factories, and other sources.81 The legislative grant of author-
ity that the EPA received decades ago drives its decisions today, even
though Congress was not at all focused on global climate change when
the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act were adopted,82 relatively
few members of Congress who voted for the Clean Air Act remain in
73. For an overview of the EPA’s regulatory initiatives, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the
Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421 (2011); see also Coal. for
Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113–14 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting
challenge to EPA regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7401–7671q (2006).
75. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
76. Legislation to authorize federal regulation of greenhouse gases narrowly passed
the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009, but was not even brought up in the U.S.
Senate. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 477, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2009/roll477.xml (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (indicating
that the American Clean Energy and Security Act passed the House by a vote of 219
to 212 on June 26, 2009).
77. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
78. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
79. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
80. The last major amendments to the Clean Air Act were added in 1990. See id.
81. See, e.g., Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Remarks on the Endan-
germent Finding on Greenhouse Gases (Dec. 7, 2009) (saying the EPA is “obligated
to take reasonable efforts to reduce greenhouse pollutants under the Clean Air Act”),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/dff15a5d01abdfb18525735900
40b7f7/b6b7098bb1dfaf9a85257685005483d5!OpenDocument.
82. ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT 419 (2001); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Warming up to Climate Change
Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63, 69–72 (2007).
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Congress today,83 and Congress has never taken any action to affirma-
tively approve the regulation of greenhouse gases in the years since
the Act was first adopted or subsequently amended.84 Indeed, the EPA
maintains that to apply the Clean Air Act, as actually written, to the
emission of greenhouse gases would produce “absurd” results, and
grind air pollution permitting programs to a halt.85 This is because the
statutory emission thresholds that trigger the Act’s requirements were
written for traditional pollutants, which are generally emitted in far
lesser amounts than carbon dioxide, and applying such thresholds to
carbon dioxide increases the number of regulated facilities by orders
of magnitude.86 As a consequence, the EPA argues it has the authority
to “tailor” the Act’s requirements to the agency’s determination of
what would be practical, without legislative approval.87
Although the EPA is exercising authority ostensibly delegated by
Congress, Congress is not politically accountable for the EPA’s ac-
tions. Members of both parties decry the EPA’s policies, arguing they
are too lenient or strict, as if the decision whether to regulate green-
house gases was the EPA’s and the EPA’s alone.88 Further, insofar as
83. As of January 2013, there were only two members of Congress who were mem-
bers of Congress when the Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970 and fifty-one members
of Congress who were members of Congress when the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 were passed. See House Seniority List—112th Congress, ROLL CALL, http://
www.rollcall.com/politics/houseseniority.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013); Senate Se-
niority List—112th Congress, ROLL CALL, http://www.rollcall.com/politics/
senateseniority.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
84. Some bills have specifically sought to block the EPA’s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Dina Fine Maron, New Anti-EPA Bill Aims to ‘Rein in’
Agency’s Climate Rules Permanently, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2011, 10:10 AM), http://
www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/03/04/04climatewire-new-anti-epa-bill-aims-to-rein-
in-agencys-cl-37816.html; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985) (“Although we are chary of attributing significance to Con-
gress’s failure to act, a refusal by Congress to overrule an agency’s construction of
legislation is at least some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, partic-
ularly where the administrative construction has been brought to Congress’s attention
through legislation specifically designed to supplant it.”).
85. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010); see also Adler, supra note 73, R
at 422.
86. See Adler, supra note 73, at 433–34. R
87. The EPA’s “tailoring rule” was challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, which held that industry plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the rule
because they would be subject to emission controls whether or not the rule were “tai-
lored.” See Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir.
2012) reh’g denied, 2012 WL 6621785 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).
88. The EPA’s proposed regulation has been derided by both Democrats and
Republicans. See Letter from Senator Sherrod Brown to President Barack Obama
(Feb. 28, 2011), available at http://www.brown.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EPAlet-
ter1.pdf (calling the Clean Air Act “remarkably successful,” while expressing con-
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some maintain that the EPA’s actions are based upon a misreading of
congressional intent, it is difficult for Congress to correct the agency’s
course without reopening and revising a major environmental stat-
ute.89 In the meantime, the EPA has taken it upon itself to amend the
Clean Air Act’s numerical emission thresholds that trigger stationary
source permitting requirements so as to ensure a “common sense” ap-
proach to emissions control that Congress never conceived, let alone
adopted.90
These are not isolated examples. Numerous federal agencies ex-
ercise substantial regulatory authority under old and often outdated
statutes. Though Congress passed the statutes, and Congress is ulti-
mately responsible for the power these agencies wield, Congress is not
particularly accountable for how agencies today exercise power
granted years ago. Agency authority, once granted, is difficult to mod-
ify or repeal. Drafting and adopting new legislation to revise existing
agency authority is a laborious process not well suited to active
agency oversight and control. As a consequence, the delegation of reg-
ulatory authority, once granted, becomes entrenched and is only rarely
revisited.
cerns over the “unintended consequences of imprudent regulation” of greenhouse
gases); Press Release, Senator Joseph Manchin, Rockefeller, Manchin Lead Col-
leagues in Fight to Protect Coal and Manufacturing State Economies (Jan. 31, 2011),
available at http://manchin.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=330724& (“No bureaucratic
agency should be able to regulate what has not been legislated, especially when their
actions jeopardize thousands of jobs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Press Re-
lease, Senator Mary L. Landrieu, Landrieu Votes to Block EPA’s Overreach on Regu-
lating Greenhouse Gases (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.landrieu.senate.
gov/?p=press_release&id=1427 (“The Clean Air Act was designed to reduce the smog
and acid rain that was choking our cities in the 1970s and 1980s, not to limit carbon in
our atmosphere.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Press Release, Congressman Ed
Whitfield, Committee Passes Whitfield Bill to Stop EPA Regulation of Greenhouse
Gases (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://whitfield.house.gov/press-release/commit-
tee-passes-whitfield-bill-stop-epa-regulation-greenhouse-gases (“[D]ecisions with
such sweeping influence on jobs and the economy must be made by elected members
of Congress and not by unelected executive branch staff.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Fred Upton & Tim Phillips, How Congress Can Stop the EPA’s
Power Grab, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2010, at A15 (saying the EPA’s regulation of
Greenhouse Gases “represents an unconstitutional power grab that will kill millions of
jobs—unless Congress steps in”).
89. The Congressional Review Act is not a practical means of preventing the adop-
tion of regulations opposed by congressional majority. See infra Part II.
90. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (final rule). The tailoring rule was
challenged in federal court, but the D.C. Circuit concluded none of the petitioners had
standing to challenge this rule. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 113.
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II.
PRIOR EFFORTS AT LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
Over the years Congress has adopted various reforms aimed at
restoring political accountability, disciplining federal agencies, and
ensuring that federal regulatory policy is responsive to contemporary
legislative priorities, without sacrificing the practical benefits of dele-
gation. Indeed, legislative oversight and review may, in many re-
spects, facilitate greater delegations of regulatory authority, as
Congress may be more comfortable delegating substantial amounts of
power if it is assured that it retains a degree of oversight and control.91
While well-intentioned, these efforts have been largely unsuccessful at
disciplining regulatory agencies or ensuring that regulatory policy re-
flects popular sentiment.
In the mid-twentieth century, Congress attempted to control ad-
ministrative agency decision making through the adoption of legisla-
tive veto provisions.92 Between the 1930s and 1980s, Congress
enacted legislative veto provisions within nearly three-hundred stat-
utes.93 These provisions enabled Congress to delegate broad legisla-
tive-like authority to administrative agencies while retaining the
unilateral authority to overturn administrative decisions through legis-
lative action, but without presidential assent or a veto-proof majority.
The Immigration and Nationality Act contained a typical legisla-
tive veto provision, which authorized either house of Congress to in-
validate a decision by the Attorney General to allow an otherwise
deportable alien to remain in the United States with a simple resolu-
tion passed by majority vote.94 By allowing either house to override
an agency decision, the legislative veto provisions effectively required
concurrent agreement by the President and both houses of Congress
before an agency decision could take effect, for dissent by either the
Senate or the House of Representatives was enough to veto the action.
Such provisions were frequently used, but they were short-lived.
91. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Executive has . . . [generally] agreed to legislative review as the price for a broad
delegation of authority.”); see also Michael Herz, The Legislative Veto in Times of
Political Reversal: Chadha and the 104th Congress, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 324
(1997) (noting that the legislative veto was developed “as a means for allowing mas-
sive concessions of authority to the executive” by ensuring Congress would retain the
ability to review and control such delegations).
92. JAMES R. BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 20 (1990).
93. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944 (internal citation omitted).
94. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(c), 66 Stat. 163,
216 (1952) (as amended), invalidated by Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
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In 1983 the Supreme Court invalidated unicameral legislative ve-
toes in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.95 The
Court held that it was unconstitutional for a single house of Congress
to overturn an administrative action taken pursuant to a valid grant of
legislative authority.96 Overturning an administrative action was, in
effect, a legislative act. Under Article I of the Constitution, legislative
acts require bicameralism and presentment—the concurrence of both
houses of Congress and presentation to the President for his signature
or veto, the latter of which could be overturned by super-majorities in
both legislative chambers.97
Although Chadha eliminated the availability of the legislative
veto, Congress had been considering and enacting other regulatory re-
forms in an effort to increase accountability and improve regulatory
policy even before the case was decided. In 1980, for example, Con-
gress enacted the Regulatory Flexibility Act98 and the Paperwork Re-
duction Act,99 which required agencies to consider the costs of new
regulatory initiatives and consider less burdensome alternatives. The
latter statute also created the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget to for-
malize White House oversight of federal regulatory activity.100 Over a
decade later, Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA)101 and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act (SBREFA),102 intended to reduce the economic burdens of regula-
tory requirements imposed on state and local governments and small
business entities, respectively. With each of these reforms Congress
required agencies to devote more attention to the economic and other
consequences of their rules, but did not constrain the ultimate choices
agencies could make.
Over the same period, successive presidential administrations
also sought to impose greater discipline on the regulatory process,
while also centralizing White House control over executive branch
95. 462 U.S. 919.
96. Id. at 954.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
98. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980).
99. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812.
100. Id. § 3503(a). For a broad discussion of OIRA’s contemporary responsibilities,
see generally Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192639.
101. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48.
102. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
121, §§ 201–253, 110 Stat. 847, 857–75.
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agencies.103 A series of executive orders, beginning under President
Gerald Ford, laid out standards for regulatory analysis and established
the parameters of White House review of regulatory initiatives.104
These orders, combined with more aggressive monitoring of agency
activities by OIRA, made executive branch agencies more responsive
and accountable to the President.105 This did not make such agencies
more accountable to Congress, however.
The most recent effort to impose greater legislative control on
regulatory policy was the Congressional Review Act of 1996
(CRA).106 The CRA created an expedited process for consideration of
joint resolutions to overturn regulations of which Congress disap-
proved.107 In effect, the CRA created a framework for Congress to
enact new laws to overturn or correct administrative implementations
of previously enacted laws. The purpose of the CRA was to provide
Congress with a quick and easy way to invalidate regulatory initiatives
with which a majority of Congress disagreed, although such resolu-
tions could still be subject to a presidential veto. The CRA has not
been particularly effective, largely because it is difficult to enact con-
gressional resolutions of disapproval that are still subject to presiden-
tial veto, nor have there even been many attempts to use it.108
The core of the CRA is a mechanism whereby Congress could, at
its own initiative, act to overturn significant regulatory actions. Under
the CRA, before any new rule may take effect, the promulgating
agency must submit a report on the rule to each house of Congress and
the Comptroller General.109 If the regulation is deemed a “major
rule”—defined for purposes of the Act as any rule that OIRA con-
cludes is likely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 mil-
lion or more, or otherwise have significant effect on consumer prices
103. See Kagan, supra note 6. R
104. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. 926 (1971–1975) (President
Ford); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979) (President Carter); Exec. Order
No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (President Reagan); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3
C.F.R. 323 (1986) (President Reagan).
105. For an empirical examination of the effects of White House review, see Steven
Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003).
106. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(B).
108. See, e.g., Sean D. Croston, Congress and the Courts Close Their Eyes: The
Continuing Abdication of the Duty to Review Agencies’ Noncompliance with the Con-
gressional Review Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 907, 911 (2010); Morton Rosenberg,
Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief Over-
view, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1999).
109. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
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or the economy110—it may not take effect for at least sixty days after
its submission to Congress.111 This waiting period was adopted to pro-
vide Congress with an opportunity to review major rules and consider
whether to overturn them. For this purpose, the CRA creates a stream-
lined procedure whereby Congress may overturn a major regulation by
enactment of a joint resolution by both houses.112
That the CRA has not had much effect on federal regulatory ac-
tivity should not surprise. There is tremendous inertia within the legis-
lative process, and if Congress is required to take the initiative to
overturn an unjustified or excessive regulation, it is unlikely to hap-
pen. Other priorities compete for legislators’ time and attention. The
streamlined procedure may make it easier to obtain a vote on joint
resolutions to disapprove of new regulations, but members of Con-
gress are not always eager to cast a vote for or against a controversial
or high-profile regulation.113 The CRA’s effectiveness is further di-
minished by the failure of many agencies to comply with its
requirements.114
Since its enactment, several joint resolutions disapproving new
regulations have been introduced, and only one such resolution has
been enacted. As the Congressional Research Service reported,
through 2008, joint resolutions of disapproval were introduced for
fewer than five percent of the regulatory actions to which the CRA
procedure could be applied.115 Of the forty-seven total resolutions in-
troduced, only three passed even one house of Congress.116 The only
joint resolution actually enacted was a measure disapproving of the
110. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 802.
113. See Cindy Skrzycki, Will Congress Wake up to Its Rule-Blocking Weapon?,
WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1998, at G1 (noting congressional reluctance to “risk political
capital on attacking regulations that the public seems to support”).
114. See Croston, supra note 108, at 908–09. According to the Congressional Re- R
search Service, agencies routinely fail to submit final rules to the Comptroller General
even though such submission is required before such rules may take effect. See CUR-
TIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40997, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT:
RULES NOT SUBMITTED TO GAO AND CONGRESS (2009). Agencies also sometimes fail
to identify rules that will have a greater than $100 million economic impact as “major
rules.” See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael Cannon, Taxation Without Representation:
The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, HEALTH MATRIX
(forthcoming) (discussing IRS rule authorizing tax credits for purchase of health in-
surance on federal exchanges).
115. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116, CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRES-
SIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 6 (2008).
116. Id.
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ergonomics rule adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration during the Clinton Administration.117
One particular problem is that the CRA effectively requires a
super-majority in Congress to overturn an administrative action. This
is because a President is likely to veto any legislative effort to over-
turn a regulation issued by his own administration.118 Only those rules
adopted near the end of a President’s term are vulnerable to CRA re-
peal—because the next President may sign a joint resolution—and the
executive can reduce the vulnerability of regulations to CRA review
by ensuring new rules are not issued at the tail end of a presidential
term. During the last year of the Bush Administration, for example,
agencies were put on notice that they needed to finalize new regula-
tions early enough so that they would not be subject to repeal under
the CRA.119 As a consequence, the CRA has not done much to in-
crease legislative control over, or accountability for, federal regulatory
policy.
III.
THE REINS ACT
The REINS Act seeks to discipline federal regulatory agencies
and enhance congressional accountability for federal regulations with-
out replicating the problems of prior reform efforts or sacrificing the
benefits of agency expertise and specialization. The central provision
of the REINS Act provides that new major rules cannot take effect
unless Congress passes a joint resolution approving the regulation
within seventy session or legislative days of the rule’s submission to
Congress.120 “Major rules” are defined as those regulations that are
anticipated by the White House Office of Management and Budget to
impose annual economic costs in excess of $100 million or otherwise
117. Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disapproval of the Rule Submit-
ted by the Department of Labor Under Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States Code,
Relating to Ergonomics, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001).
118. See Nick Smith, Restoration of Congressional Authority and Responsibility
over the Regulatory Process, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 326 (1996); see also Herz,
supra note 91, at 323 (“Requiring presidential approval (or a two-thirds majority to R
override) is hardly a formality.”).
119. See Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Chief of Staff, White House, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (May 9, 2008), available at http://www.
ombwatch.org/files/regs/PDFs/BoltenMemo050908.pdf; see also Charlie Savage &
Robert Pear, Administration Moves to Avert Late Rules Rush, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2008, at A1 (noting effect of memo would be to make it more difficult for new admin-
istration to reverse course).
120. Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10,
112th Cong. § 3 (to amend 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)).
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have significant economic or anticompetitive effects.121 Joint resolu-
tions of approval, once passed by both houses of Congress, are then
forwarded to the President for his signature (or veto).122
A key feature of the REINS Act is that it creates an expedited
procedure to ensure prompt consideration of resolutions of approval in
each house of Congress. First, it provides that such a resolution is
automatically introduced into each house once it is finalized by the
agency.123 Second, legislative committees have a limited time period
during which they may consider the resolution. Unlike with legisla-
tion, the failure of a committee to act does not kill the resolution.
Rather, after fifteen session days, the resolution is automatically
placed on the House or Senate calendar whether the committee has
acted or not.124 Third, the REINS Act provides that resolutions of ap-
proval are privileged, not subject to amendment, and not subject to
dilatory procedural motions.125 Debate is limited in each house and a
resolution may not be filibustered in the Senate.126 As introduced in
the 112th Congress, the REINS Act is drafted so as to ensure that a
resolution of approval is voted up-or-down in each house within sev-
enty session or legislative days of when an agency finalizes a major
rule.
These provisions effectively disable the traditional means legisla-
tors and special interest groups use to slow or stop legislative propos-
als. Whereas traditional legislation can be bottled up in committee or
held up by a determined handful of legislators, resolutions of approval
under the REINS Act cannot be disposed of without a majority vote.
The Act requires an additional step before new major rules can be-
come effective, but it also requires members of Congress to openly
declare their support or opposition for a specific rule.
In effect, the REINS Act amends pre-existing regulatory statutes
to remove federal agency authority to unilaterally adopt major regula-
tory measures, instead requiring agencies to forward “final” rules as
proposals for congressional review. Requiring congressional approval
before economically significant rules may take effect ensures that
121. Id. (to amend 5 U.S.C. § 804(2)).
122. Joint resolutions are subject to the Constitution’s presentment requirement like
any other bill. The only exception to this rule is a joint resolution used to propose a
constitutional amendment. Such a resolution is instead submitted to the states for rati-
fication. See Joint Resolution, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/refer-
ence/glossary_term/joint_resolution.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
123. H.R. 10, 112th Cong. § 3 (to amend 5 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2)).
124. Id. (to amend 5 U.S.C. § 802(c), (e)).
125. Id. (to amend 5 U.S.C. § 802(a)(3), (d)–(e)).
126. Id. (to amend 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)–(e)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL101.txt unknown Seq: 23 28-MAR-13 9:43
2013] “REINS” ON REGULATIONS 23
Congress takes responsibility for major regulatory policy decisions.
Adopting an expedited legislative process, much like that which has
been used for fast track trade authority or base closings,127 ensures
that major regulatory initiatives are considered by each house of Con-
gress while simultaneously preventing the congressional review re-
quirement from unduly delaying needed regulatory initiatives. As a
consequence, the REINS Act enhances transparency and accountabil-
ity without creating a significant new procedural obstacle to the adop-
tion of needed regulatory measures.128
Under the REINS Act, Congress would only be responsible for
considering a small percentage of the regulations proposed by federal
agencies in a given year.  While federal agencies promulgate over
3,000 new regulations each year, only a fraction of these constitute
“major” rules. From 1998 to 2010, for example, federal agencies
promulgated between fifty and one hundred major rules per year.129
Expedited consideration of this number of rules would not signifi-
cantly increase the legislative workload or obstruct other business.
Congress gives expedited consideration to a wide array of matters
every year.  Consider that a new president will nominate a few hun-
dred people to Cabinet and agency positions that require Senate con-
firmation in just the first year of an administration.130 Even with the
recent rise of partisan obstruction, most nominees go through with
minimal delay—and without obstructing or compromising other legis-
lative business.131 In the case of confirmations, Senate rules and tradi-
tions provide many ways for a small minority of senators to gum up
the works. A single senator can place a “hold” on a controversial or
undesirable nominee.132 No such means of obstruction are available
127. See infra notes 158–163 and accompanying text. R
128. See Rosenberg, supra note 108, at 1088–89 (with a legislative approval require- R
ment “ultimate decisionmaking responsibility for important issues of national policy
by Congress will be clear, highly visible, discrete, well-defined, and thereby be sub-
ject to unprecedented substantive scrutiny and evaluation by the voting public”).
129. CREWS, supra note 23, at 33. R
130. Under the last four Presidents, nominations for Cabinet and agency positions in
the first year have ranged between a low of 249 in the George H.W. Bush Administra-
tion and a high of 326 in the Obama Administration. See ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WAITING FOR LEADERSHIP 9 (2010), available at http://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_appointments.pdf.
131. The rate of confirmations within the first year for such nominees has ranged
from 92.4% in the George H.W. Bush Administration to 80.4% in the Obama Admin-
istration. Id.
132. See Charlie Savage, Obama Limits Lasting Stamp on the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2012, at A1. Even with the increased use of “holds” and other obstruction
tactics, the Senate still manages to confirm individuals to fill hundreds of executive
branch positions and dozens of judicial vacancies every year.
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under the REINS Act, however, so there is no way for special interests
to secretly stall a resolution of approval. It is for this reason that the
REINS Act is unlikely to impede Congress’s ability to consider other
matters, nor is it likely to become a tool of obstruction for those op-
posed to new regulatory measures.
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
The modern regulatory state may not have been present at the
nation’s founding, but its basic architecture and practices have been in
place for over sixty years and are now well-established.133 The REINS
Act would substantially alter longstanding administrative practice, at
least with regard to major regulatory initiatives. This drastic reorienta-
tion of established procedures has led some commentators to raise
concerns about the REINS Act’s constitutionality, particularly given
its potential effect on executive authority. While such concerns are
understandable, they are unfounded. Whether or not the REINS Act
would be good policy,134 it would be constitutional under current law.
A. INS v. Chadha
An obvious question for REINS Act supporters is how the con-
gressional approval requirement can be constitutional if a unicameral
legislative veto, such as that considered in INS v. Chadha,135 is not.
After all, in either case an agency determination is effectively vetoed
if a majority of either house disapproves. The legislative veto in
Chadha enabled a single house to block an agency ruling by passing a
simple resolution. Under the REINS Act, both houses must vote in the
affirmative for a major rule to take effect. For practical purposes, each
requires bicameral consent for the agency decision to stand. For con-
stitutional purposes, however, the formal differences between the two
are significant.
As then-Judge Stephen Breyer explained in a 1984 lecture, a con-
gressional authorization requirement could replicate the function of
the legislative veto invalidated in Chadha without the veto’s constitu-
tional infirmity.136 By observing the formal requirements for legisla-
tion in Article I, he explained, congressional oversight of agency
133. The Administrative Procedure Act, for instance, was enacted in 1946. Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
134. See infra Part V.
135. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
136. See Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785,
793–96 (1984).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL101.txt unknown Seq: 25 28-MAR-13 9:43
2013] “REINS” ON REGULATIONS 25
activity could be maintained without violating constitutional principles
of separation of powers.137 Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe
likewise concluded at the time that such a requirement would be con-
stitutional, even if he also thought it would be a bad idea.138
The Presentment Clause in Article I, section 7 of the Constitution
provides that, for a bill to become law, it must be passed by a majority
of both the House and Senate and signed into law by the President or,
if vetoed by the President, re-passed by two-thirds majorities in each
house.139 It further provides that “[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote
to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the President of the United
States” for his signature or veto.140 The REINS Act complies with
both the bicameralism and presentment requirements of this clause,
and is therefore constitutional. Just like any other bill, a joint resolu-
tion under the Act requires the approval of both houses of Congress
and is presented to the President.141
In some respects the REINS Act is more limited than Breyer’s
proposal for congressional resolutions of approval for regulatory mea-
sures or the unicameral legislative vetoes at issue in Chadha, further
blunting any potential constitutional concerns. In contrast to those pro-
cedures, the REINS Act would only require congressional approval
for so-called “major rules.” Before Chadha, the unicameral legislative
veto often operated as a replacement for targeted “private bills” affect-
ing the interests of a few.142 However, those regulations subject to the
REINS Act would, by definition, be those that have broader impacts
on large segments of the country, if not the nation as a whole. Only
those rules deemed to be “economically significant” are covered, and
such rules are a small, but important, portion of federal regulatory
activity. From 1998–2010, the number of major rules promulgated by
137. Id. at 797.
138. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other
Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19 (1984) (noting that a congressional approval
requirement for agency regulations would be constitutional).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
140. Id. The only exception to this rule is a joint resolution used to propose a consti-
tutional amendment. Such a resolution is instead submitted to the states for ratifica-
tion. See Joint Resolution, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_
term/joint_resolution.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
141. See Senate Legislative Process, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legisla-
tive/common/briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm#1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
142. In Chadha, the House of Representatives voted to overturn 6 of 340 cases in
which the Attorney General had concluded an otherwise deportable alien should be
allowed to remain in the United States. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926 (1983).
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federal administrative agencies ranged between twenty-seven and
eighty-one per year.143
B. Executive Authority
Some members of Congress, including Representative John
Conyers, have expressed the concern that the REINS Act unduly inter-
feres with executive authority.144 Sally Katzen, former Administrator
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Clinton
Administration, has cited Morrison v. Olson for the proposition that “a
statute is suspect if it ‘involves an attempt by Congress to increase its
own powers at the expense of the executive branch,’”145 and has ar-
gued that it is reasonable to see the REINS Act as an effort to con-
strain the executive.146 A look at the bill’s full title and statement of
purpose reinforces this concern.147
The problem with these arguments is that they ignore the distinc-
tion between executive and legislative functions: the executive power
to “enforce” the laws—that is, the power to take action to see that
legal rules are complied with—is distinct from the quasi-legislative
power to make the rules pursuant to a delegation of authority from
Congress. The power to enforce a given rule—whether a limit on
emissions, an affirmative disclosure requirement, or something else—
is different from the power to set a limit on emissions, mandate disclo-
sure, and so on. The former may inhere in an executive agency, but
the latter does not. The power to adopt legislative-type rules is not a
core executive function; it is a power that only exists due to a legisla-
tive grant.
As a general matter, executive agencies have general (and largely
unreviewable) discretion over how to enforce particular legislative re-
quirements.148 Exercise of such executive discretion, such as the dis-
cretion of a prosecutor to decide which crimes to investigate or
prosecute, may not be controlled by Congress. A requirement that fed-
eral regulatory agencies obtain congressional approval before major
rules may take effect asserts congressional control over legislative-like
143. CREWS, supra note 23, at 27. R
144. REINS Act Hearing I, supra note *, at 8–9 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.,
Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also Editorial, Undermining the
Executive Branch, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at A26.
145. REINS Act Hearing I, supra note * at 96 (statement of Professor Sally Katzen
(citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988))).
146. Id. at 96–97.
147. See Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10,
112th Cong. §§ 1–2.
148. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL101.txt unknown Seq: 27 28-MAR-13 9:43
2013] “REINS” ON REGULATIONS 27
policy decisions, however, and leaves such discretionary authority
untouched.
The Constitution’s separation of powers among the three coordi-
nate branches was designed as “a self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other.”149 The Court has consistently sought to block Congress from
interfering “with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and
his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed’ under Article II.”150 But, as Morrison itself illustrates,
Congress is not prevented from limiting or constraining the exercise of
power it delegates to the executive branch.151 The Court upheld the
independent counsel law, despite its intrusion on core executive func-
tions, because it did “not involve an attempt by Congress to increase
its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch.”152
Unconstitutional aggrandizement occurs when the legislature
seeks to seize executive powers for itself, not when it places limits on
rulemaking authority created by prior legislative grants. Federal agen-
cies have no authority to promulgate regulations beyond that which
has been given by Congress—and what Congress has given, it may
take back. That Congress may restrain the exercise of such authority,
whether by adopting rules for the exercise of regulatory authority (as
under the Administrative Procedure Act or the Congressional Review
Act) or limiting the scope of such authority, is perfectly acceptable, so
long as other constitutional requirements (such as bicameralism and
presentment) are satisfied. As the REINS Act does in fact satisfy such
requirements, there is no constitutional problem. The REINS Act does
not curtail inherent executive power so much as it places limits on the
legislative-like power delegated by Congress.153 As Justice Breyer
noted, requiring congressional approval for the adoption of new regu-
latory initiatives “imposes on Congress a degree of visible responsibil-
ity” for new regulatory initiatives more than it limits executive
149. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 (citing
Buckley).
150. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90 (internal citation omitted).
151. Id. at 693–94 (“[W]e have never held that the Constitution requires that the
three branches of Government ‘operate with absolute independence.’”) (internal cita-
tion omitted).
152. Id. at 694; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (warning
against “dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions”);
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 (same).
153. REINS Act Hearing II, supra note 22, at 96 (prepared testimony of Eric R. R
Claeys) (“The power to promulgate legislative rules is not inherently executive, as the
power to prosecute is.”).
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authority.154 While the REINS Act would reduce the discretion of ex-
ecutive and independent agencies to adopt far-reaching regulatory
measures, it would neither interfere with core executive functions nor
constrain the inherent discretionary authority of the executive branch.
C. Entrenching Legislative Rules
A more serious constitutional question about the REINS Act is
whether a statute may impose binding legislative process rules on ei-
ther house of Congress. Article I, section 5 of the Constitution pro-
vides, “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”155
Some interpret this provision to mean that each house has exclusive,
unilateral control over its own rules, and that it would be unconstitu-
tional to preempt such authority with a statute subject to presentment
to the executive.156 Alternatively, this provision could simply mean
that each house retains the authority to alter its own procedural rules,
statutes to the contrary notwithstanding.157 This would mean that a
subsequent House or Senate could unilaterally repeal the procedural
rules the REINS Act creates for expedited consideration of resolutions
of approval.
Adopting rules of legislative procedure through statute is nothing
new, and Congress has observed such limits throughout history. The
practice dates to the founding period.158 To this day Congress enacts
laws altering legislative procedures to limit debate or otherwise pro-
vide a “fast track” for consideration of particular measures.159 Begin-
ning in the 1970s, Congress authorized the President to negotiate trade
agreements that would be submitted to Congress for consideration on
a straight up-or-down vote without amendment and without being sub-
ject to traditional procedural obstacles.160
Although Congress traditionally includes “disclaimer clauses” in
fast track legislation asserting each chamber’s right to change its own
rules unilaterally, neither house has exercised this authority to amend
154. Breyer, supra note 136, at 794. R
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
156. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrench-
ment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL.
345, 409 (2003).
157. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 365–66 (2004).
158. See, e.g., Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23, 23 (prescribing the administra-
tion of oaths “previous to entering on any other business”).
159. See Bruhl, supra note 156, at 346 n.9 (2003) (listing examples of “debate-regu- R
lating statutes”); see also id. at 363 n.79 (listing fast track provisions that do not have
disclaimer clauses).
160. See id. at 357–58.
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or prevent prompt consideration of a trade agreement submitted under
fast track procedures.161 One reason for this is that a vote to undo the
fast track procedures would be recognized as a vote against the mea-
sure in question.162 There may also be reluctance within Congress to
undermine the viability of procedural mechanisms that can be used to
accelerate the condition of important measures. Once the precedent of
undoing such fast track measures were established, it would be diffi-
cult to repair to such measures in the future.163 If nothing else, concern
for maintaining legislative norms has discouraged either house from
attempting to undo prior deals that altered special procedural rules.
V.
POLICY CONCERNS
Just because the REINS Act would be constitutional does not
mean that it would be wise. Little in the Constitution prevents Con-
gress from adopting unwise or foolhardy initiatives. Many REINS Act
critics worry that it would unduly constrain federal regulatory initia-
tives and make it too difficult for agencies to adopt needed protections
for public health and the environment. The REINS Act “would
threaten critical public protections” according to the Coalition for Sen-
sible Safeguards.164 Further, many critiques of the REINS Act misun-
derstand (or misrepresent) the substance of the bill. Others embrace an
unduly alarmist view of the REINS Act’s likely effect on new regula-
tory policies, fueled by exaggerated claims made by the REINS Act’s
proponents. In all likelihood, both advocates and critics alike overstate
the likely effect of the REINS Act.165
161. According to a 2002 Senate Report, “when fast track legislation has been in
place for trade agreements, neither House has ever acted unilaterally to withdraw ap-
plication of fast track procedures.” See id. at 369 (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-139, at 54
(2002)).
162. Id.
163. A similar dynamic could explain why Senate majorities have not exercised their
authority to alter Senate rules to eliminate the filibuster of judicial nominations, as had
been proposed. Once this “nuclear option” were to be exercised for the first time, it
would be difficult to prevent its repeated use in the future. Similarly, once Senate
Democrats chose to filibuster Republican judicial nominees in the 2000s, it became
easier for Republicans to justify filibusters of Democratic judicial nominees. See, e.g.,
Jeff Sessions, Op-Ed., Playing by Reid’s Rules on Filibusters, WASH. POST, Nov. 27,
2009, at A23.
164. Press Release, Coal. for Sensible Safeguards, Regulations Save Lives, Contrib-
ute to Job Growth, Groups Tell Lawmakers (May 16, 2011), available at http://sensi-
blesafeguards.org/press-releases/regulations-save-lives-contribute-to-job-growth-
groups-tell-lawmakers.
165. See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law”, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585,
1614 (2012) (“Tighter limits upon delegation might restrain a particular channel for
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The REINS Act provides a means of curbing excessive or unwar-
ranted regulation, but it is not an obstacle to needed regulatory mea-
sures supported by the public. If agencies are generally discharging
their obligations in a sensible manner, REINS Act-type controls will
have little effect. Indeed, even if federal regulatory agencies are over-
zealous, the REINS Act may not curtail federal regulation all that
much. The Act only applies to new major rules—so existing regula-
tions would remain untouched—and would constrain regulatory and
deregulatory initiatives alike. Perhaps more significantly, it is not clear
that members of Congress would be so quick to condemn regulatory
proposals if they knew they would be required to back up their con-
demnation with an on-the-record vote. There is no question agencies
are already responsive to congressional pressures, but most such influ-
ence is exercised by committee leaders and is largely hidden from
public view.166 Making such influences more transparent is all the
more reason to force congressional votes on legislative rules.
It is easy to claim the EPA has adopted an overly expensive rule,
but it may be more difficult to actually vote against pollution controls
than to pontificate against them if it means a legislator has to take
responsibility for a lack of federal action. As New York Law School’s
Professor David Schoenbrod has argued, administrative delegation has
often resulted in less environmental protection than there might have
been had Congress been required to take responsibility for federal pol-
icy.167 Based on his experience as a litigator for NRDC, he believes
lead would have been phased out of gasoline much earlier were it not
for Congress’s ability to abdicate responsibility for making a policy
choice by delegating the matter to an administrative agency.168 Some
of the nation’s most important environmental gains were not the result
of regulations promulgated by administrative agencies but rather were
directly enacted by Congress.169
exercising federal authority, but there is little reason to think that it would ultimately
reduce the expression of that authority through the other channels accessible to federal
power.”).
166. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGA-
TION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 3, 235–37 (1991)
(documenting indirect ways in which Congress influences the exercise of delegated
power).
167. Schoenbrod, supra note 58, at 359. R
168. Id. at 351–54; see also SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 58–81. R
169. As former OIRA director Christopher DeMuth observes, “some of the most
effective environmental policies, such as automobile tail-pipe emissions standards,
have been statutory standards.” DeMuth, supra note 33, at 85 (noting that David R
Schoenbrod has recognized that phenomenon).
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Some critics fear that requiring congressional approval of new
major rules would create additional opportunities for corporations or
other economic interests to influence or obstruct regulatory measures.
Yet corporate interests have far more influence on agency rulemakings
than on open votes on the floor, largely because the former is far more
insulated from public view.170 However much the legislative process
may favor concentrated interest groups, the regulatory process is even
more imbalanced.171 [a]s one analysis of public participation in federal
rulemaking observed, “[a]gency officials too often hear mainly from
politically popular or well-organized interests, which may make up
only a subset of the overall interests that will be affected by many
regulatory decisions.”172 In any event, the average citizen is unaware
of much that occurs within the rulemaking process and lacks the time,
resources, and expertise to engage with this process.173 Much congres-
sional intervention in agency activities is likewise obscured from pub-
170. As Richard Stewart noted over thirty years ago:
It has become widely accepted . . . that the comparative overrepresenta-
tion of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision re-
sults in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests. Such
overrepresentation stems from both the structure of agency decisionmak-
ing and from the difficulties inherent in organizing often diffuse classes
of persons with opposing interests.
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1713 (1975). Even if agencies are not subject to “capture” by interest
groups, “they certainly inhabit the same culture and come to share its perspectives and
enthusiasms.” DeMuth, supra note 33, at 77. R
171. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 99, 103 (2011) (documenting “interest group imbalances” in the rulemaking pro-
cess); see also Schoenbrod, supra note 58, at 361 (noting that corporate money can R
buy influence within the rulemaking process just as it does within Congress, but that
“in politics, votes trump money”).
172. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin, & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and
Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the
New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 932 (2009); see also Beth Simone
Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 453 (2004)
(“For the most part, each agency has a regular constituency of regulated parties and
inside-the-Beltway interest groups.”).
173. See Coglianese, Kilmartin, & Mendelson, supra note 172, at 933 (“The lack of R
meaningful access to important information detracts from the public’s ability to con-
tribute to the formulation of better rules.”). Compare Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and
Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781 (1999)
(suggesting that administrative agencies are “often the most accessible site for public
participation” in the policymaking process), with Stuart W. Shulman, The Case
Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in
U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23, 36 (2009) (noting low quality of
public participation in complex rulemakings).
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lic view.174 Local media are far more likely to cover how a legislator
votes on the floor than how the same legislator pressures an agency
behind the scenes.175 The enactment of additional procedural require-
ments for administrative rulemakings is one way to discipline agen-
cies, but the adoption of more complex procedures can make the
representational imbalance even worse.176
The REINS Act not only brings major regulatory decisions into
the sunlight, it also disarms the various legislative procedures that
concentrated interest groups regularly use to their advantage in the
legislative process. Interest groups are often able to work behind the
scenes through congressional committees to advance their interests.
The existence of numerous “veto gates” in the legislative process cre-
ates opportunities for groups and allied representatives to extract con-
cessions or prevent adoption of unwanted measures.177 The legislative
process, as traditionally structured, makes it quite difficult to enact
new laws, which is precisely why the REINS Act would limit and
streamline this process. As a consequence, it would be far easier to
obtain a legislative vote on a new major rule under the REINS Act
than it is to obtain a vote on new regulatory legislation.
The primary effect of the REINS Act would not be to stop regu-
lation across the board, but to ensure that those major regulations
adopted are those that can command majority legislative support, not
merely those that are endorsed by concentrated or highly motivated
interests—and that appears to be what has REINS Act opponents most
concerned. University of Richmond law professor Noah Sachs warns
the REINS Act “would do serious damage to American health and
prosperity—stopping agencies from promulgating important rules
that, among other things, would help prevent bank failures, ensure the
safety of the food we eat, and control toxic pollution in the air we
breathe.”178 Sachs’s unstated premise is that many of these “important
rules” that are so necessary for the public good could not prevail on
174. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
61, 68 (2006) (discussing congressional involvement in agency implementation of
federal laws).
175. See David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 745 (1999).
176. See McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 55, at 469 (“More elaborate R
procedures are generally regarded as favorable to regulated industries. Because indus-
tries possess much of the information relevant to regulatory decisions, elaborate
processes give them more power by increasing the importance of that information.”).
177. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 7 (1994) (defining “veto
gates”).
178. Sachs, supra note 18. R
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straight up-or-down votes. That is, the current, unaccountable regula-
tory process is necessary precisely because it enables the adoption and
enforcement of rules that could not command the support of a majority
of legislators voting in the open.
Dean Richard Revesz of N.Y.U. School of Law and his colleague
Michael Livermore argue that the REINS Act puts undo emphasis on
the “costs” of regulation. In the Huffington Post, they wrote:
By focusing exclusively on the downsides of regulation, and not the
benefits, the implication of this proposed legislation is that protect-
ing the health and safety of Americans is not worth the costs that
regulated entities must pay. But in fact, the opposite is often true:
These rules can produce billions of dollars in net benefits.179
This critique simply misses the point. The REINS Act focuses on
“major” rules because such regulations involve the most consequential
policy choices, not because such rules are presumptively unwise or
necessarily generate more costs than benefits. New regulatory mea-
sures may well produce substantial benefits, economic or otherwise.
The question is whether the benefits justify the costs—however mea-
sured—recognizing that many costs and benefits are difficult to quan-
tify and implicate contested normative claims. Regulatory decisions
are policy decisions that must necessarily rest upon value judgments.
As a consequence, they are the sorts of decisions best made by elected
representatives who can be held accountable for their decisions. That
some regulations “produce billions of dollars in net benefits” is no
reason not to subject them to the democratic process. Indeed, an open
and transparent debate on such measures might well increase the legit-
imacy of and support for needed regulatory interventions.
Regulations commandeer private resources, forcing them to be
allocated to one purpose or another. Sometimes this is necessary or
wise, but neither a cost-benefit nor a cost-effectiveness analysis will
demonstrate this fact. Showing that a given rule is “cost-effective” in
accord with a particular metric as compared with other regulatory al-
ternatives does not establish that such a regulation is the wisest course,
or even that it is preferable to doing nothing at all. We cannot afford
every net beneficial idea, any more than the federal government or a
private firm can afford to make every investment that is expected to
yield a positive return. Moreover, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness
analyses are notoriously manipulable and imprecise—as progressives
179. Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Hold the REINS: Regulations
Generate Major Economic Benefits, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:48 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-l-revesz-and-michael-a-livermore/hold-the-
reins-regulation_b_804211.html.
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like to remind us—and they have extreme difficulty accounting for
subjective value preferences and normative concerns, such as the dis-
tributional impact of rules.180
The Revesz-Livermore argument is echoed by the University of
Michigan’s David Uhlmann. On the blog of the American Constitu-
tion Society, Uhlmann warned it would be terrible to let Congress de-
cide whether to regulate the private sector:
Do we want the Congress, with all of its partisan influences, to be
the arbiter of sound science and best practices in areas as complex
as toxicology, engineering, ecology, and pharmacology? Do we be-
lieve that we would have more efficient and more effective regula-
tion if we empowered Congress, rather than scientists and
engineers, to decide fundamental questions about environmental
protection, public health, and motor vehicle safety?181
This argument suggests that some technical policy decisions are
too important to be left to our elected representatives and should in-
stead remain in the hands of unelected agency officials. The question
is not whether we would have “more efficient and more effective reg-
ulation” but whether we would have regulations that align more
closely with public preferences and that can be justified through ma-
jority political support. Whether a given regulatory measure is worth
the cost is a normative question, not simply a matter of administrative
or technical expertise. Contrary to Uhlmann’s suggestion, it is not
“scientists and engineers” in regulatory agencies who make the ulti-
mate regulatory decisions, but political appointees who are often well-
insulated from political and popular influence—at least in comparison
to elected representatives.
Some REINS Act critics argue the reform is unnecessary because
federal regulatory agencies are already subject to sufficient over-
sight.182 They argue that this oversight ensures that federal agencies
do not promulgate excessive regulation, as demonstrated by studies
which conclude the benefits of federal regulations outweigh their
costs.183 This may be so, but it is irrelevant. As noted above, that a
180. See generally REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 36. R
181. David M. Uhlmann, The REINS Act: A Future Without Environmental, Health,
and Safety Protections, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/
acsblog/the-reins-act-a-future-without-environmental-health-and-safety-protections.
182. See, e.g., Sally Katzen, Why the REINS Act Is Unwise If Not Also Unconstitu-
tional, REGBLOG (May 3, 2011), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2011/05/
why-the-reins-act-is-unwise-if-not-also-unconstitutional.html.
183. E.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 36, at 3 (“The esti- R
mated annual benefits of major Federal regulations reviewed by OMB from October
1, 2000, to September 30, 2010, for which agencies estimated and monetized both
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government analysis concludes that a given rule is net beneficial does
not, by itself, mean that it is good policy; but the REINS Act would
not prevent the adoption of needed, popular measures. It would, how-
ever, discipline agency behavior insofar as agency officials would be
more likely to draft regulatory proposals with an eye to what could
obtain majority support in Congress. In this fashion, the Act would
further make regulatory policy decisions more responsive to congres-
sional concerns.
In a recent article in The New Republic critical of the REINS Act,
Professor Sachs posed the following hypothetical: “Imagine if the
board of a Fortune 500 company required the company’s vice presi-
dents to obtain board approval before implementing any decision.
Now imagine that the board is highly polarized and its members are at
each other’s throats. A recipe for corporate gridlock, right?”184
If Professor Sachs’s hypothetical were analogous to what the
REINS Act proposes, it would be a devastating critique—but it’s not.
Imagine instead if the board of a Fortune 500 company required the
company’s vice presidents to obtain board approval before implement-
ing the two or three percent of decisions that are most important and
potentially costly. This would not surprise, nor produce “gridlock.” To
the contrary, it is precisely the course we would expect a responsible
board to take. Indeed, failure to do so could be seen as a breach of the
board’s fiduciary duties.185 Should Congress be held to a lesser stan-
dard? All the REINS Act would do is ask Congress to take responsi-
bility for the less than five percent of the federal regulations
promulgated in any given year that “major rules” represent, while
leaving more routine matters alone. Thus Sachs’s board analogy actu-
ally reinforces the case for REINS-type measures.
If the public believes that more regulations are necessary, or sup-
ports regulatory initiatives of a particular type, requiring a resolution
of congressional approval will not stand in the way. Indeed, it would
enhance the legitimacy of those regulations Congress approves by
benefits and costs, are in the aggregate between $132 billion and $655 billion, while
the estimated annual costs are in the aggregate between $44 billion and $62 billion.”).
184. Sachs, supra note 18. R
185. A corporate board member’s “duty of care” includes the duty to monitor the
actions of the corporation. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig.,
325 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 192
F.R.D. 111, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967; see also Eliza-
beth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe Harbor
for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367,
375–77 (2008) (discussing directors’ “duty to monitor” corporate activities).
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making clear that such initiatives command the support of both the
legislative and executive branches. If environmental regulation is as
popular as environmentalist groups claim, then there is really nothing
to fear from the REINS Act. Even if the Act allows conservatives in
Congress to vote down some new major rules—a plausible scenario
now that Republicans control the House of Representatives—anti-reg-
ulatory members of Congress will suffer for opposing the regulatory
protections Americans want. The REINS Act forces major regulatory
decisions onto the floor of Congress, and into the open, which pro-
vides greater transparency than backroom dealmaking or the adminis-
trative rulemaking process. Above all else, the REINS Act provides a
means of enhancing political accountability for regulatory policy.
Unlike some other proposed regulatory reforms, the REINS Act
would not have much deregulatory effect.186 The REINS Act would
not have any effect on the thousands of regulations already on the
books. Further, by its terms, the Act would apply to all major rules,
regulatory and deregulatory alike. A decision to repeal or revise a reg-
ulation so as to reduce regulatory burdens on businesses would be
subject to the congressional approval requirement just as a decision to
enhance such requirements would. This would blunt the use of the Act
as a means of rolling back existing regulatory controls.
CONCLUSION
Federal regulation reaches nearly all aspects of modern life and is
pervasive in the modern economy. Much of this regulation may be
necessary or advisable, and nothing in the REINS Act would hinder a
sympathetic Congress from approving new federal regulations. In all
likelihood, however, the REINS Act’s congressional approval process
would prevent the implementation of particularly unpopular or contro-
versial regulatory initiatives. The primary effect of the legislation
would be to make Congress more responsible for federal regulatory
activity by forcing legislators to voice their opinion on the desirability
of significant regulatory changes.187
186. See Federal Sunset Act of 2009, H.R. 393, 111th Cong. (proposing review at
least every twelve years of each agency for abolishment or reorganization); see also
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, RICHARD MURPHY & JAMES GOODWIN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM, REGULATORY ‘PAY GO’: RATIONING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (2012) (critiqu-
ing the “regulatory pay-go” anti-regulatory proposal embraced by Republican presi-
dential nominee Mitt Romney).
187. As David Schoenbrod notes, “[t]he rhetoric surrounding REINS [has done] a
disservice by posing the problem as controlling agencies when it is really making
Congress accountable.” Schoenbrod, supra note 58, at 355. R
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James Landis, who is often credited as the New Deal “architect”
of the modern administrative process, advocated extensive delegation
of regulatory authority to administrative agencies. His arguments in
support of delegation are commonly repeated to this day.188 Less well
remembered is that Landis also believed Congress should take ulti-
mate responsibility for major regulatory initiatives.189 Given potential
constitutional and practical concerns about widespread delegation,
Landis thought it would be “an act of political wisdom to put back
upon the shoulders of Congress” ultimate responsibility for regulatory
policies.190 The REINS Act would seek to put such wisdom into
practice.
188. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 6 (noting pervasiveness and influence of Landis’s R
arguments).
189. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 146. R
190. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 76. R
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